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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
THE KING CAN Do WRONG-MAYBE:
ABOLITION OF COURT-IMPOSED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
FOR NONDISCRETIONARY NEGLIGENT ACTS
One of the more interesting developments in the law has been
the struggle of state courts to come to grips with the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity.' Although the definite trend in the courts
is totally or partially to vitiate this anachronistic doctrine,' some
state courts, for a variety of reasons, have continued to employ
it as a shield to protect negligent acts of state and political sub-
division employees.' Absent any clear legislative waiver, these
courts continue to follow the twisted path of applying such con-
cepts as the governmental-proprietory or ministerial-discretionary
distinctions to determine if liability can be imposed." This flury
of court activity has been the genesis for a spate of law review
articles examining both the history and the viability of the state
sovereign immunity doctrine.'
MISSISSIPPI EMBRACES THE TREND
Until recently, Mississippi had neither adopted a state tort
1. For a discussion of recent court decisions and legislative activity concerning the doc-
trine, see Roberts and Thronson, A New Perspective -Has Utah Entered the Twentieth Century
in Tort Law? 1981 UTAH L. REV. 495; Taylor, A Re-Examination of Sovereign Tort Immunity
in Virginia, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 247 (1981); Note, Governmental Liability: The Kansas Tort
Claims Act [or the King Can Do Wrong] 19 WASHBURN L.J. 260 (1980); Note:, Governmental
Tort Immunity in Massachusetts: The Present Need for Change and Prospects for the Future, 10
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 521 (1976); Comment, Sovereign Immunity in Connecticut: Survey and
Economic Analysis, 13 CONN. L. REV. 293 (1981); Comment, A Case for Abrogation of Municipal
Tort Immunity in Mississippi, 41 Miss. L.J. 289 (1969-70); Note, Survival of the Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity in Mississippi -Jones v. Knight, 1 Miss. C. L. REV. 463 (1980).
2. See generally, Oliver, Chasse v. Banas: The Eroding Doctrine of State Sovereign Im-
munity, 21 N.H.B.J. 324 (1980); Olson, Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability- Two Decades
of Decline: 1959-1979, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 485 (1979). Justice Bowling in his dissent in Jones
v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254, 258 (1979) states "that over thirty states have completely abolished
governmental immunity."
3. See Horton v. U.S., 622 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1980) (Applying S.C. Law); Sikes v. Candler
County, 247 Ga. 115,274 S.E. 2d 464 (Ga. 1981); Neal v. Donahue 611 P.2d 1125 (Okla. 1980);
Lick v. Dahl, 285 N.W.2d 594 (S.D. 1979).
4. See generally, Hellerstein and Wells, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980); Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception
to Government Tort Liability, 61 MARQ. L. REv. 163 (1977); Note, Tort Law-Municipal
Immunity-Replacement of a Stop Sign is a Governmental Function, 42 Miss. L.J. 398 (1972).
5. See generally, Lambert, Tort Law, 36 ATLA L.J. 20 (1976); Leonard, Municipal Tort
iability: A Legislative Solution Balancing the Needs of Cities and Plaintiffs, 16 URn. L. ANN.
305 (1979); Note, An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort, 50 S. CALIF. L. REV.
515 (1977); Note, Torts-Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity-Scope of Retained Immunity, 43
Mo. L. REV. 387;(1978).
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claims act. nor judicially abolished state sovereign immunity.6
Given the conservative fiscal nature of the legislature and recent
Mississippi Supreme Court pronouncements," it was unlikely that
any wholesale abrogation of the doctrine would take place in the
near future. Instead, it was predicted that any chipping away at
the doctrine, much to the dismay of frustrated litigants, would
occur in an incremental fashion by actions of the state supreme
court and the legislature.
Utilization of this incremental approach was emphasized in
two recent supreme court decisions concerning sovereign immuni-
ty, CIG Contractors, Inc. v. Mississippi State Building
Commission' and French v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply
District. 9 In CIG, the court held that legislative authorization for
the State Building Commission to enter into contracts necessari-
ly resulted in a waiver of sovereign immunity. 0 This was logically
sound as a contract would not in essence be a contract if one side
could breach it with impunity. The court in French, however, took
a somewhat contrary position, holding that the Pearl River Valley
District's purchase of an insurance contract without legislative
authorization did not waive its protection from suit under the
sovereign immunity doctrine.1
Plaintiffs in French were seeking $850,000" in property
damages alleging that the District and its Board of Directors were
negligent in maintaining the water level at the Ross Barnett Reser-
voir. According to the plaintiffs the water at the reservoir had
been kept dangerously high to promote real estate development
in the area. 3 When the torrential rains occurred during the 1979
6. The Mississippi Supreme Court has been wrestling with the doctrine throughout the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. In 1911 in City of Pass Christian v. Fernandez, 100 Miss. 76,
56 So. 329, a driver of a city garbage cart was deemed by the court to be providing a corporate,
not a governmental function. Counties were first held to be immune in Brabham v. Board of Super-
visors of Hinds County, 54 Miss. 363 (1877), and counties were held to possess the same degree
of immunity as states in City of Grenada v. Grenada County, 115 Miss. 831, 76 So. 682 (1917).
Mississippi cases recently decided upholding the doctrine include Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d
254 (1979) (State Immunity), Davis v. Little, 362 So. 2d 642 (1978) and Berry v. Hinds County,
344 So. 2d 146 (1977) (County Immunity), Nathaniel v. City of Moss Point, 385 So. 2d 599
(1980) and Warren v. City of Gulfport, 378 So. 2d 1098 (1980) (City Immunity-Governmental
Function).
7. The Mississippi Supreme Court had repeatedly stated that any relief from the doctrine
must emerge from the state legislature. See Jagnandan v. Miss. State Univ., 373 So. 2d 252,
254 (1979); Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254, 256 (1979); Berry v. Hinds County, 344 So. 2d
146, 151 (1977).
8. 399 So. 2d 1352 (Miss. 1981).
9. 394 So. 2d 1385 (Miss. 1981).
10. 399 So. 2d at 1355.
11. 394 So. 2d at 1387.
12. Brief for Appellant at 10.
13. Id. at 6.
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Easter season, excess water had to be released from the reservoir
which resulted in the flooding of the Pearl River and damage to
the plaintiffs property. The case was dismissed at the circuit court
level on appellee's demurrer claiming sovereign immunity.
On appeal, appellants argued that both the legislature and the
District had waived sovereign immunity.1 " The legislature had
waived immunity by an express grant to the District "to sue and
be sued in its corporate name.""5 Although the words possess a
clear meaning in the English language, the court held that they
take on a convoluted aspect when translated to legalese. 6 Citing
Berry v. Hinds County,'7 the court stated that a general grant of
authority to sue or be sued was not in itself an express or implied
waiver of immunity." Concerning this holding, the court was on
safe grounds judicially, 9 but certainly not semantically.
Plaintiffs second argument, whether the District's purchase
of insurance constituted a pro tanto waiver of immunity, resulted
in the court's writing on what heretofore had been a blank slate.
Again following the general rule,"° the court held that the District's
purchase of insurance on its own volition did not waive immuni-
ty up to the limits of the policy."' Since the legislature was in the
best position to limit liability and was also charged with the respon-
sibility of finding the ways and means to pay judgments, the court
concluded that immunity should be waived only by express
legislative fiat. "2 Even though the doctrine in Mississippi was
judicially created,23 the court in French continued to show great
deference to the legislature under this separation of powers
theory. 24
Unpredictably, such deference was severely curtailed in Pruett
v. Rosedale."5 Although Justice Bowling, the author of the court's
14. 394 So. 2d at 1386.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 344 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1977).
18. 394 So. 2d at 1386. The specific statute is found at Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-9-121 (j) (1972).
19. The seminal Mississippi case restricting liability even though there is a general grant
of authority to sue is State Highway Commission v. Gully, 167 Miss. 631, 145 So. 351 (1933);
Accord, State v. Woodruff, 170 Miss. 744, 766, 150 So. 760, 762 (1933).
20. The general rule is stated in 68 A.L.R. 2d 1473 (1959).
21. 394 So. 2d at 1388.
22. Id. at 1387.
23. Jones v. Knight, 372 So. 2d 254, 265 (Miss. 1979).
24. A persuasive discussion of the problems of legislative abrogation is found in Justice Bowl-
ing's dissenting opinion in Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d at 265.
25. 421 So. 2d 1046 (Miss. 1982). The only issue presented to the court was the sovereign
immunity doctrine. Since the doctrine was set aside for the instant case, the case was remanded
to the Bolivar County Circuit Court. At this writing, the liability of a policeman for a ministerial
act had not been decided.
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opinion in Pruett, had written a powerful dissent in Jones,"6 few
persons expected that the court would overrule one hundred years
of precedent." Also it was unexpected that four justices would
switch their votes.28 This switch in voting combined with the votes
of the new justices on the court-Justices D. Lee, Hawkins, and
Prather-resulted in a unanimous decision.
The timing of the Pruett mandate was also surprising given
the economic recession gripping the state and the nation. As the
late Chief Justice Earl Warren observed, justices are neither
"monks nor scientists" and are sensitive to political and economic
events taking place within society.29 Supposedly, one of the ma-
jor reasons for the recalcitrance of the legislature in removing
sovereign immunity was the fear that such suits would injure the
state's treasury. Pruett was handed down at a time when the state
was experiencing a shortfall in tax revenue and federal monies
while demands for state services were accelerating.
Finally, the court had just confronted the legislature in the
battle over the new rules of civil procedure.3" Although the court
in Pruett carefully mapped out a role for the legislature in draw-
ing the boundaries where the state can be sued, it did reverse itself
on the issue of who should be the initiator in striking down the
doctrine.
ANALYSIS OF THE Pruett Decision
There were sound reasons, however, to abolish the doctrine.
As Justice Bowling noted in Pruett, the doctrine had become
somewhat of an anachronism as all but six states had substantial-
ly modified their immunity doctrines. 3 In an age of insurance and
concern with spreading risks, the doctrine had fallen prey to the
maxim "cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex."
Second, the procedure allowing parties injured by the state
to receive legislative redress by the passage of private and local
26. 373 So. 2d at 257.
27. A listing of the long line of cases overruled is listed in Appendix A of the opinion. 421
So. 2d at 1052.
28. Chief Justice Patterson and Justice Bowling had dissented in recent sovereign immunity
cases. See e.g., Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254, 257 (Miss. 1979). Justices Sugg, Walker, Broom
and R. Lee were evidently persuaded to change their stance. Justices D. Lee, Hawkins, and Prather
were squarely addressing the issue for the first time.
29. Warren, "The Law and the Future," 52 Fortune 106 (1955).
30. On May 26, 1981, the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted new rules of civil procedure.
The new rules will take precedent over the statutorily imposed rules and some scholars would
argue that the court usurped legislative power in promulgating the new rules. See Page, Constitu-
tionalism and Judicial Rulemaking: Lessons from the Crisis in Mississippi, 3 Miss. C. L. REV.
1 (1982).
31. 421 So. 2d at 1047.
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bills simply was not a viable mechanism for relief.32 It is hard
to conceive of a more inefficient procedure. Legislators should
be much too busy to handle bills of this nature and in some in-
stances it costs more to process the bill than the amount awarded
to the injured party.3 Also, in some instances amounts are paid
that would not be paid if litigated, and, more seriously, in some
situations the amounts awarded are insufficient. Plus, the private
bill remedy is subject to all the vagaries of the political process."
An injured party must know of the process, have access to a
legislator or intermediary and the bill must survive cumbersome
legislative procedures. As a remedy, the private bill was as er-
ratic as the legislative waivers of immunity that were contained
in the state code.3
Third, the sovereign immunity doctrine was clearly unfair
to parties who happened to be injured by the negligence of a per-
son operating in the public sector vis-a-vis a party injured by the
negligence of a person acting in the private sector. In the latter
situation various statutory protections and the doctrine of
respondeat superior could apply to provide a path to a remedy.
With the shield of sovereign immunity in place, the opportunity
for a remedy in many cases was effectively blocked. Also, the
termination of the doctrine requires that the state must exercise
the same cautions in procedures and the hiring of personnel as
the private sector. Besides giving protection to the citizens of the
state, abolition also prevents the harm of unredressed citizen
grievances. In fact, the failure of the state to allow a remedy caus-
ing the individual to absorb the loss could be more costly to the
state in the long run.3
Recognizing the above, the court correctly abolished the
sovereign immunity doctrine in Pruett with the cessation, except
for the instant case, to take place July 1, 1984." 7 The prospective
32. An examination of the House and Senate Journals from 1971-1982 indicates the legislature
approved a total expenditure of $687,963.21 to compensate injured citizens. The yearly range
was $29,888.49 (1973) to $162,289.06 (1977).
33. The range of compensation per bill during the ten-year period was from $4.50 to
$82,500.00.
34. Taylor concludes the private bill remedy is subject to political favoritism and is a finan-
cial and administrative burden on state legistatures. Taylor, supra note 1 at 260.
35. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 55-9-89 (Supp. 1982) (county park commissioners), 59-5-37 (Supp.
1982) (State Port Authority), 59-17-31 (Supp. 1982) (State Inland Port Authority), 61-3-15 (Supp.
1982) (airport authorities), 41-29-108 (1972) (State Bureau of Narcotics), 21-15-6 (Supp. 1982)
(municipalities), 19-7-8 (Supp. 1982) (counties), 41-55-5 (1972) (public ambulances), 49-19-117
(Supp. 1980) (State Forestry Commission), 47-5-75 (1972) (State Board of Corrections).
36. For a discussion of the harm of unredressed citizen injuries, see Comment, Sovereign
Immunity in Connecticut, supra note 1 at 311-15.
37. 421 So. 2d at 1052.
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application of the decision was to allow the legislature to take the
necessary action to establish the boundaries for bringing suits
against the state.
The court rested its arguments for abrogation on three
grounds: (1) precedent in sister jurisdictions and related immunity
cases, (2) due process, and (3) fairness. The scope of the deci-
sion is broad, applying to all state, county and local governmen-
tal activities deemed to be nondiscretionary in nature.38
As noted above, abundant precedent existed from other states
which had abolished or severely restricted the sovereign immunity
concept. It seemed particularly persuasive to the court that three
states in close proximity to Mississippi-Florida, Louisiana and
Alabama3'-had abolished sovereign immunity. The court in Pruett
also drew heavily on the reasoning used to abolish the doctrine
in opinions from the Supreme Courts of Minnesota, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Kansas, often citing long ex-
cerpts from these opinions."0 Plus, the court had precedent from
within the state that could be used to support Pruett. Finding
charitable immunity no longer to be a viable doctrine, the court
in 1951 concluded that it should be abolished. 1 Perhaps even more
inferential, but no less persuasive, the well-known products liabili-
ty case of Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Miss. v. Bruener was cited
by the court 2 to emphasize the general rule that there exists a
"natural inherent duty" for a person performing an act to act sen-
sibly and intelligently to avoid injury or be held "accountable at
law."43 Logically, the court saw no reason why this rule should
not be applied to the state in its widespread operations as well
as to the private sector.
To give constitutional underpinnings to its due process argu-
ment, the court cited Article III of the 1890 Mississippi Constitu-
tion. Article III mandates: "All courts shall be open; and every
person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
shall be administered, without sale, denial, or delay." Interpreting
this constitutional clause broadly, the court concluded that
regardless of the source of the injury, every aggrieved person
should have the opportunity to seek a remedy in court. This argu-
38. Id.
39. 421 So. 2d at 1047.
40. 421 So. 2d at 1048-1051.
41. Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951).
42. 245 Miss. 276, 148 So. 2d 199 (1962).
43. Id. at 282, 148 So. 2d at 201.
44. MIss. CONsT. art. HI, § 24.
[Vol.3:103
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
ment, although much more benign in its application here, is similar
to the economic due process arguments posited in the late nine-
teenth century. That is, a remedy is not really a remedy unless
the controversy has been adjudicated in a court of law. The court
found ample support for this "day in court" theory in decisions
stemming from Florida,"' Minnesota ' and Missouri. '
The third major thrust of the court's opinion was that the doc-
trine was inherently unfair: unfair to persons injured by negligent
actions of the state and to employees of the state on whom, given
the shield provided the state by the immunity doctrine, the suit
would necessarily be focused. Employees of private firms could
be protected by the doctrine of respondeat superior or by the
employee's insurance coverage, but many state employees would
be left to pay the judgment out of their own resources. Thus, in-
equity could result in that the injured party would be unable to
reach a financial cache sufficient to fund a judgment. The state's
attempt to ameliorate the harshness of the doctrine by statutorily
approving the purchase of insurance by some state agencies only
exacerbated the unfairness of the situation before Pruett. ' Whether
one could recover was dependent on which state agency was guilty
of tortious conduct.
THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE
At the end of the first major section of the opinion the court
cleverly aborts a judicially created doctrine by passing the respon-
sibility for supervision of the doctrine from the courts to the
legislature. 9 The wording of this particular passage suggests that
the court is really shedding power rather than taking action that
the legislature is reluctant to take itself."s In Pruett the court in
fact forced the legislature to take some legislative action.
Furthermore, the mandate of Pruett provided legislative
guidance. Its reach included sovereign immunity at all levels of
state government but gave the legislature two sessions to enact
a state tort statute. More importantly, following the model of the
Federal Torts Claims Act, Pruett maintains the immunity for state
45. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
46. Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975).
47. Jones v. State Highway Commission, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977).
48. See supra note 35.
49. 421 So. 2d at 1051.
50. Three actions relating to sovereign immunity were introduced in the 1982 Mississippi
legislative session. Only H.B. 1022, An Act to Authorize the Establishment of Trusts for the
Payment of Certain Claims Against Hospitals, passed. The other two, a general waiver statute
(H.B. 595) and an act to require liability insurance on state-owned vehicles (H.B. 794), failed
to get out of committee.
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employees in the executive, legislative and judicial branches when
they are performing discretionary acts." While maintenance of
such immunity is common in order that public officials not be
inhibited in rendering policy-making decisions, often whether an
act is discretionary or ministerial is the subject of court deter-
mination. There will remain, therefore, a role for the Mississip-
pi courts in resolving sovereign immunity controversies.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
is on the wane in America. As our society continues to embrace
the concept that there should be a remedy for every injury,
sovereign immunity, like its legal cousins parental, spousal and
charitable immunities, will decline as a protective shield for
negligent conduct. In Pruett the Mississippi Supreme Court cor-
rectly gave the doctrine a strong push down a slippery slope. It
remains to be seen what path the state legislature will take either
to support or to negate the impact of the decision.
RONALD G. MARQUARDT
51. 421 So. 2d at 1052.
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